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We study how communication affects cooperation in an experimental public goods
environment with punishment and counter-punishment opportunities. Participants
interacted over 30 rounds in fixed groups with fixed identifiers that allowed them to
trace other group members’ behavior over time. The two dimensions of communication
we study are asking for a specific contribution level and having to express oneself
when choosing to counter-punish. We conduct four experimental treatments, all
involving a contribution stage, a punishment stage, and a counter-punishment stage
in each round. In the first treatment communication is not possible at any of the
stages. The second treatment allows participants to ask for a contribution level at
the punishment stage and in the third treatment participants are required to send a
message if they decide to counter-punish. The fourth combines the two communication
channels of the second and third treatments. We find that the three treatments
involving communication at any of the two relevant stages lead to significantly higher
contributions than the baseline treatment. We find no difference between the three
treatments with communication. We also relate our results to previous results from
treatments without counter-punishment opportunities and do not find that the presence
of counter-punishment leads to lower cooperation level. The overall pattern of results
shows that given fixed identifiers the key factor is the presence of communication.
Whenever communication is possible contributions and earnings are higher than when
it is not, regardless of counter-punishment opportunities.
Keywords: cooperation, norms, accountability, punishment, experiments
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we use experiments to study the effects on cooperation of two types of communication.
We do this in the context of a public good game with material punishment and material counter-
punishment similar to but distinct from the one introduced in the seminal paper by Nikiforakis
(2008)1. In our experiments participants repeatedly play a game involving a contribution stage, a
punishment stage and a counter-punishment stage. We allow for communication separately at the
contribution stage and the punishment stage as well as at both stages. Our work in this paper is
part of our broader interest in studying the inter-play between punishment, communication and
cooperation.
1From now on the terms punishment and counter-punishment will always be meant in the material sense, i.e., as the
imposition of material losses on others.
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The possibility of inflicting punishment has been found to
play an important role in improving cooperation in experimental
environments (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002;
Sigmund, 2007; Dreber et al., 2008). However, it has also been
shown that the presence and use of punishment can have negative
side effects of various kinds.
The first drawback of the presence of punishment is that it may
lead to breakdowns of cooperation. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
provide an interesting example of this. In their experiment, a
day care center started charging a small fine to parents who
arrived late to pick up their children. Surprisingly, this resulted
in an increase in the number of parents arriving late. Fehr and
Rockenbach (2003) report similar results. They present evidence
from a trust game, showing that trustees reciprocate less when
they face the threat of punishment. Appealing only to extrinsic
motivations, as punishment does, may lead to crowding out of
intrinsic motivations to cooperate (Deci and Ryan, 1985, see
Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012, for a survey), and to “moral
disengagement” (Bandura, 1991).
Second, undesirable effects of punishment can be caused by
a dysfunctional use of it, like when punishment is directed
at high contributors to a public good, a phenomenon also
known as antisocial punishment (Anderson and Putterman,
2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Gachter and Herrmann, 2011).
Third, the actual use of punishment can also lead to the
reduction of welfare for the group involved due to an excessive
use of resources to inflict punishment. In many experiments, the
incurred costs of punishment outweigh the gains from increased
cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Egas and Riedl, 2008;
Herrmann et al., 2008).
Our focus in this paper is on the effects of communication
in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities. Our study
was inspired by the seminal paper by Nikiforakis (2008), but
our focus and some of the crucial elements of our design are
quite different from his. First, our focus is on how in the
presence of counter-punishment opportunities communication
can affect behavior, whereas Nikiforakis (2008) showed that,
in the absence of communication, the addition of counter-
punishment opportunities can undo the positive effect of
punishment opportunities on cooperation. Second, we look at
a case of partners with fixed identification numbers in which
participants can trace each other’s behavior perfectly over time,
whereas Nikiforakis (2008) studies the case of partners but
without fixed identifiers. This distinction is important and
may be the origin of some of our results. More on this
below.
Nikiforakis (2008) is at the origin of the literature on counter-
punishment. He finds that the presence of counter-punishment
opportunities changes behavior substantially. First, it leads to a
reduced use of punishment as a disciplinary device. The data
show that approximately one quarter of all punishments is
retaliated. The threat of revenge weakens subjects’ willingness
to punish free riders. Second, cooperation levels are lower than
without counter-punishment (but higher than without both
punishment and counter-punishment). Third, earnings are lower
than earnings in the case with only punishment (which are again
lower than without both punishment and counter-punishment).
In a complementary study based on a similar design, Denant-
Boemont et al. (2007) create different information conditions to
explore the relative strength of the effects of counter punishment
as revenge toward those who punished them and as punishment
directed at low punishers in the punishment stage. They find that
people use counter-punishment as revenge, but also to punish
those who fail to punish low contributors. Overall, they find that,
as in Nikiforakis (2008), the possibility of counter-punishment
leads to lower levels of cooperation.
Balafoutas et al. (2014) provide evidence on the effects of
third-party punishment and counter-punishment in a one-shot
three-player game. In their game, player B can take money from
player A in a way that increases earnings inequality. Player C
can then punish player B. The study compares behavior with and
without a third stage in which player B can now counter-punish
player C. The results show that many B players are willing to
counter-punish and that the threat of counter-punishment has
a large negative effect on the use of punishment. However, the
existence of counter-punishment does not have any effect on
selfish (non-cooperative) behavior by player B. In this sense, it
is not a positive force in this case either.
Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) study the effects of
punishment in an experimental environment with 10 rounds
in which the number of punishment stages, and hence the
length of a round, is endogenously determined by participants.
They analyze the case where identification numbers change
from round to round and the case where they are kept
constant across rounds. It turns out that feuds, in the sense of
participants punishing each other heavily across rounds, are rare
in these experiments, because people use strategies that avoid
the breakout of feuds. When identification numbers are constant
over rounds (so-called long feuds) people’s willingness to engage
in altruistic punishment is greatly reduced. Cooperation rates
decline over time leading also to a decline in earnings relative to
a treatment in which altruistic punishment cannot be retaliated.
Engelmann and Nikiforakis (2015) study the effects of
punishment in experiments with 30 rounds where, as in
Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011), the number of stages of each
round is endogenously determined. They impose few restrictions
on who can punish whom or when. They conduct a total of
three treatments. In a baseline treatment fixed groups play thirty-
rounds of a public good game without punishment opportunities
in which identification numbers change from round to round.
Two other treatments allow for multiple stages in each round.
The only difference between them is that in one of them
identification numbers vary over rounds whereas in the other the
numbers are constant punishment. They report that they find no
evidence of punishment leading to higher earnings despite the
long horizon2.
Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) show that approximately one
quarter of all punishments are retaliated. In their experiments,
the existence of a counter-punishment stage reduces punishment
2Nikiforakis et al. (2012) also study the emergence of feuds but in an environment
with normative conflict, which arise from the fact that individuals derive different
benefits from the public good. They find that in such a setting punishment is much
more likely to trigger counter-punishment and start a feud.
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of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing
second-order “perverse” punishment. They find that the
existence of punishment does not lead to an increase in
efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge there is no previous study on the
effects of communication in the presence of counter-punishment
opportunities and the aim of this paper is to fill this gap. In
our view, the detrimental effects of punishment observed in the
laboratory may be largely explained by the fact that they are
used without any kind of explanation or justification. In natural
environments punishment is not merely material but part of a
broader phenomenon. It is typically meted out with reprimand,
blame, criticism, gossip, and derision, enforcing strategies that
naturally express social disapproval and signal norms (Ellickson,
1991; Boehm, 1999; Ostrom, 2005; Wiessner, 2005; Boyd et al.,
2010), where by social norms we refer to prescribed behaviors
shared and enforced by a community.
By contrast, laboratory studies have usually modeled
punishment only by allowing players to castigate each other by
the imposition of material costs. We think that when represented
in these terms punishment is severely limited in its function of
teaching people what the social norms governing the situation
are and inform individuals about how they should behave
(Cialdini et al., 1990; Crawford and Ostrom, 1995; Bicchieri,
2006; Conte et al., 2013)3. Purely material punishment does
not make it possible to transparently and effectively convey
the necessary information from which subjects may learn what
constitutes socially prescribed conduct. This opacity of social
norms does not help individuals to identify the prescribed
conduct and may cause an overuse of punishment and trigger
revenge as a reaction to punishment acts not recognized as
legitimate4.
Recent experimental research has studied different ways
of increasing punishment legitimacy and tested its effect in
promoting the desired social outcome (Boyd et al., 2010; Faillo
et al., 2013; Villatoro et al., 2014). In particular, Andrighetto
et al. (2013) study how a particular type of communication
interacts with punishment. They use a game with two stages,
a contribution stage and a punishment stage, in which subjects
may combine punishment with the communication of norms,
by means of a message stating how much others should
contribute paired with a message about why the required amount
should be contributed. They provide experimental evidence that
when combined with punishment, such messages prevent the
detrimental effects of punishment both on cooperation levels and
earnings and significantly reduce the use of costly punishment.
Andrighetto et al. (2013) conclude that to effectively discipline
people and achieve high levels of cooperation, punishment
alone is not sufficient and individuals need to be placed in
3For an example of the powerful effects of communication in another context see
Brandts et al. (in press).
4As defined by Tyler (2006), legitimacy is “a psychological property of an authority,
institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe
that it is appropriate, proper and just” (p. 375) and is a fundamental element
governing social interaction. Following Zelditch (2001), we suggest that something
is legitimate if it is in accord with the norms shared within a group and that a
natural way of legitimizing the use of punishment is by identifying it as a way of
reinforcing norms and righting in violators.
a setting in which norms are effectively communicated and
properly understood.When combinedwith a normativemessage,
punishment is perceived as a way of enforcing norms and not as
a personally motivated action.
In this paper we focus on studying the effects of
communication on cooperation in the presence of both
punishment and counter-punishment opportunities. We see
this as a natural step to a fuller understanding of the effects
of communication on cooperation since—as pointed out by
Nikiforakis (2008)—natural environments will typically include
the possibility of counter-punishing. The public good game
we use in this study has three stages, a contribution stage, a
punishment stage, and a counter-punishment stage, common to
all treatments. In our experiments groups are fixed throughout
the duration of the experiment and, as already mentioned above,
participant identification numbers are also kept constant across
round. This is certainly not the only possible design choice,
but we agree with the statement in Engelmann and Nikiforakis
(2015, p. 565) that it is the most “realistic” case, since it most
closely matches conditions outside the laboratory, where people
who interact over time can often trace who did what in the past.
We conducted four experimental treatments: (1) punishment
and counter-punishment by itself, (2) punishment combined
with communication at the punishment stage and counter-
punishment (3) punishment by itself and justification message
at the counter-punishment stage, and (4) punishment combined
with communication at the punishment stage and justification
message at the counter-punishment stage.
More specifically, whereas in Treatment 1 there are no
communication opportunities, in Treatments 2 and 4, subjects
have at the punishment stage the possibility of combining
punishment with a message asking for a specific contribution
level, paired with a message providing a motivation why the
required amount should be contributed. The message was: “One
should contribute X, because: (a) In this way we are all better off,
(b) It is what one should do, (c) If not, it will have consequences
for you,” where the value of X was completed by the subject. In
these treatments, we expect that subjects perceive punishment as
legitimate, i.e., as a way of enforcing norms. Here we follow the
design used in Andrighetto et al. (2013)5.
In Treatments 3 and 4, players who decide to punish
somebody at the counter-punishment stage have to send a
free-form message to the person that is being punished. Here
we are interested in the effects of accountability, that is, of
the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called to
justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and action to others (see Tetlock,
1992)6. Xiao and Tan (2014) use a truth-telling game to study
whether the use of punishment—not counter-punishment—is
more likely to be consistent with social norms when there
is a justification requirement. They find that the presence of
justification pressure leads to punishment being more likely
to be perceived as signaling norm violation and also to more
truth-telling. Anti-social punishment may be curbed by the fact
5Our procedure uses pre-formulated messages. This may lead to different results
than full-fledged free-form communication.
6In other contexts it has been shown that this expectation affects people’s decision-
making (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Vieider, 2011; Brandts and Garofalo, 2012).
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that it is hard to justify such a use as legitimate. In our study the
focus is broader. Participants are not specifically asked to justify
themselves, but are simply called to express themselves. We study
whether the need for having to express oneself can help neutralize
the potentially negative effects of counter-punishment.
We hypothesize that the presence of communication
opportunities will lead to higher contribution, lower punishment,
lower counter-punishment as well as higher earnings compared
to the case without communication opportunities. We find
that the three treatments involving communication at
any of the two relevant stages lead to significantly higher
contributions to the public good and higher earnings than the
baseline treatment. We find no difference between the three
treatments with communication. Used separately the two types
of communication work equally well and we find no additional
effect from using them jointly. Our results also show that there
are no significant differences in the use of punishment, whereas
there is some indication that counter-punishment is lower in the
three treatments with communication.
The results are broadly consistent with the notions that
receiving messages about what constitutes socially prescribed
conduct helps individuals to coordinate on the desired outcome
and influences punishment legitimacy and that the pure pressure
of having to express oneself at the counter-punishment stage may
enhance the norm salience by encouraging one to think about
audience’s beliefs and expectations about what one should do
(Tetlock, 1985). However, our results also show that the uses of
communication at the two different points in the experiment
can’t be neatly separated from each other. Communication at
the final stage is often used to reinforce the communication of
norms about contributions and not only in relation to the use of
counter-punishment.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Procedures
Our experiments were conducted at the LINEEX laboratory
of the University of Valencia. A total of 192 participants
were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students from
the University of Valencia and voluntarily participated in our
experiment. Special care was exerted to recruit students from
many different disciplines to increase the likelihood that the
subjects had never met before. Each participant was allowed
to take part in only one session. On arrival, participants were
immediately led to separate cubicles. Instructions on general
behavior in the lab and specific instruction about the game to
be played were read by a mother tongue laboratory assistant.
The experiment was programmed by using the z-Tree platform
(Fischbacher, 2007)7.
Treatments
In each of the four treatments, 12 fixed groups of four
subjects interact over 30 rounds, divided in three blocks of
10 rounds. Players’ identification numbers are fixed over the
30 rounds. As a consequence subjects can trace one another’s
7The instructions for Treatment 4 can be found in the Appendix in Supplementary
Material.
behavior throughout the rounds8. We classify all actions
in the punishment stage as “punishments” and all actions
taken in counter-punishment stage as “counter-punishment.”
Players’ identification numbers are fixed over the 30 rounds.
As a consequence subjects can trace one another’s behavior
throughout the rounds. We classify all actions in the punishment
stage as “punishments” and all actions taken in the counter-
punishment stage as “counter-punishment.” We acknowledge
that in our design the distinction is somewhat blurred. However,
we decided to maintain the distinction between punishment and
counter-punishment, since in our case we have a rigid structure
where the counter-punishment stage of a round is immediately
followed by the contribution stage of a new round that can serve
to “reset” the interaction.
The first 10 (1–10) and the last 10 (21–30) rounds are identical
across all treatments, whereas rounds 11–20 are all distinct across
treatments. Participants were told from the start that there were
three blocks of 10 rounds, but were only informed about the rules
for each block at the beginning of that block.
In every round of rounds 1–10 and 21–30, each member i of
a group independently chooses an integer contribution level, Ci,
between 0 and 20, with the following payoff9:
Pi = 20− Ci + 0.4(C1 + C2 + C3 + C4)
After each round all the members of the group are informed
about the contribution levels of each of the other three members.
In all four treatments behavior in rounds 1–10 is supposed to
replicate with our procedures the well-known result that in a
simple public goods game contribution levels invariably decay
over time (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Behavior in rounds 21–30
will inform us about possible spillover effects of the treatment
conditions in rounds 11–20.
Rounds 11–20 of Treatment 1 consist of three stages. In stage
1 participants play the public goods game introduced above and
then get feedback about the individual decisions of others. In
stage 2 of each round participants can assign an integer amount
between 0 and 10 punishment units to each of the other group
members. Each assigned punishment unit costs the punished
member 3 units and the punishing member 1 unit. After the
punishment stage has finished participants get feedback about
the punishment that has taken place. Each punished group
member is informed about the IDs of all group members that
have punished him10. In stage 3, called the counter-punishment
8A reviewer asks us to stress that our results are only for a partners protocol with
fixed identifiers across rounds. We think that the abstract of the paper makes this
now very clear from the start.
9This function is the same as the one used in Fehr and Gächter (2000) and
Nikiforakis (2008).
10Participants could see the full vector of contributions but only the punishment,
counter-punishment andmessages they received. In the instructions it said: “At the
end of each round (period) you will receive information about the contributions
of each of the members of the group, the total contribution of the group, the
punishment points you that each of the other members of the group have sent you
(in each of the phases), the total points received in each phase, the messages each
member of the group has sent you, the profit that you obtained in the round and
the accumulated profit up to this point.” This is different from Nikiforakis (2008)
where, after each round, each subject was only informed about the total quantity of
punishment points assigned to him. Our procedure is the same as in the “Revenge”
treatment in Denant-Boemont et al. (2007).
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stage, participants can punish again11. At the end of each round,
each punished group member is informed about the IDs of
all (counter)-punishers12. We will refer to this treatment as
“punishment and counter-punishment.”
Rounds 11–20 of Treatment 2 consist of three stages, of
which stages 1 and 3 are identical to those of Treatment 1.
In stage 2 of Treatment 2 participants have, after each round,
the opportunity to both assign costly punishment points as in
Treatment 1 and send a normative message that has no payoff-
consequences for any of the players of the group (we refer to it
as the communication of norms). The content of messages has
two components: the required contribution level “One should
contribute X” (indicating the demanded token amount between 0
and 20) and a message providing a justification for contributing,
which could be one of the following three options: “because (1) in
this way we are all better off; (2) it is what one should do; and (3)
if not, it will have consequences for you.” These options capture
three different reasons for contributing: 1. achievement of a joint
benefit; 2. a sense of duty; 3. a purely individualistic motive13. We
will refer to this treatment as “sanction and counter-punishment,”
where the term sanction refers to the combination of peer norm
communication and material punishment (as in Giardini et al.,
2010; Andrighetto et al., 2013).
Treatment 3 has stages 1 and 2 identical to those of Treatment
1 and a stage 3 which is different. If a player decided to
use counter-punishment in stage 3, she was asked to write a
message to each of the persons she punished (we refer to it as
communication aimed to explain one’s action).
Specifically, a chat box opened on the computer screen and
the player had to introduce some text. It was clearly specified that
the message had no payoff-consequences for any of the players
of the group. In addition, in the instructions we wrote that the
message was completely open, but that it was not allowed to
identify oneself or to send offensive messages14. We consciously
chose this minimalistic way of asking for a reaction, since any
more explicit request or even the use of the word “justification”
we considered to be too leading15. We will refer to Treatment
3 as “punishment and counter-punishment with message.”
Treatment 4 combines the two communication possibilities of
Treatments 2 and 3. We will refer to Treatment 4 as “sanction
and counter-punishment with message.” Table 1 summarizes the
information about the four treatments just discussed.
11The exact same punishment technology than in the punishment stage applies:
participants can assign an integer amount between 0 and 10 punishment units
to each of the other group members. Each assigned punishment unit costs the
punished member 3 units and the punishing member 1 unit.
12There were no restrictions on who could punish who in both stages 2 and 3.
This is again different from Nikiforakis (2008) in which each individual had the
opportunity to punish only those who punished him.
13We consider the third message to appeal to an individualistic motive, since it
refers to payoff losses.
14Indeed, it was possible for a player to type only one character into the chat box for
themessage to be acceptable, although we did notmake this explicit to participants.
15Xiao and Tan (2014) use a somewhat more pushy way of asking for a reaction.
Their formulation in the instructions was: “Person X must write a message to
explain his/her and the explanation must be related to Person Y’s behavior.” Our
procedure is more in the sense of asking somebody “what do you have to say?”
TABLE 1 | Treatments with counter-punishment possibilities.
Treatment Name Characteristics
number
1 Punishment and
counter-punishment
No communication
2 Sanction and counter-punishment Communication at the
punishment stage
3 Punishment and
counter-punishment with message
Communication at the
counter-punishment stage
4 Sanction and counter-punishment
with message
Communication at both stages
HYPOTHESES
Our hypotheses are motivated by previous evidence about
the effects of communication and by the literature presented
in the introduction. We highlight here that our design is
a rather complex one, involving actions at three stages and
communication of different kinds at some of the three stages. We
therefore focus our hypotheses on the effects of communication
on the bottom line of the interaction, contribution and earnings
levels. We formulate two sets of hypotheses about them.
Hypothesis 1:
a. Contribution levels are higher in Treatment 2 than in
Treatment 1.
b. Contribution levels are higher in Treatment 3 than in
Treatment 1.
c. Contribution levels are higher in Treatment 4 than in all other
treatments.
Hypothesis 1a is inspired by the evidence in Andrighetto
et al. (2013). In the two-stage design used there the possibility
of communicating at the contribution stage leads to higher
contributions. We conjecture that the possibility of counter-
punishing in the current design will not undo this result, since
the use of counter-punishment will be restrained by the fact
that the norm of contributing will be made salient through
communication and substantially followed. There will be only
scant need to punish and anyway when used punishment will be
perceived as legitimate, because it is aimed at discouraging the
violation of the norm of contributing, and this will discourage
counter-punishment16.
Hypothesis 1b is based on the notion that having to
express oneself at the moment of counter-punishing may lead
participants to think about others’ expectations about socially
prescribed behavior and to act in a way that avoids negative
evaluations and reactions by others. Observe that we do not
have a hypothesis pertaining to the comparison of contribution
in Treatments 2 and 3, since we do not have an a priori
about the relative strength of the two types of communication.
16Assuming rationality, selfish preferences, and common knowledge of rationality
the sub-game equilibrium prescribes no counter-punishment, no punishment and
no contributions in the first stage. This holds for the stage game as well as for the
finitely repeated game, which can be shown by backward induction. In addition,
both types of communication have no effect.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 53
Andrighetto et al. Counter-Punishment, Communication, and Cooperation among Partners
Finally, Hypothesis 1c is based on the intuitive notion that
communication taking place through two channels will have a
stronger impact than when it only operates through one channel.
Hypothesis 2 is a translation of Hypothesis 1 into earnings
levels, where we posit that the effects of communication will be
strong enough to lead to higher earnings through a sufficiently
high increase in contribution levels and the limited use of
punishment and counter-punishment, with the corresponding
limitation in the destruction of resources.
Hypothesis 2:
a. Earnings levels are higher in Treatment 2 than in
Treatment 1.
b. Earnings levels are higher in Treatment 3 than in
Treatment 1.
c. Earnings levels are higher in Treatment 4 than in all other
treatments.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 pertain to the overall outcomes of the
interaction in the different treatments. We now discuss possible
hypotheses about punishment and counter-punishment. We
start with counter-punishment since studying the interaction
between communication and counter-punishment is the initial
motivation for our work. In Treatments 3 and 4, we expect
that the need to express oneself will lower the use of counter-
punishment with respect to Treatment 1. The conjecture for
Treatment 2 can’t be based on the impact of the need to say
something. Instead, we think that the fact of eliciting the norm
of contribution and making it salient due to the possibility of
sending a normative message will lead to high contributions and
an overall climate of cooperation that will make punishment
and consequently counter-punishment appear as pointless and
unjustified. Moreover, in those rare cases in which punishment
will be used, it will be interpreted as aimed to reinforce a norm
and not only an idiosyncratic, or personally motivated, action.
The perceived legitimacy of punishment will then reduce the
likelihood and intensity of counter-punishment.
Hypothesis 3: Counter-punishment levels are higher in
Treatment 1 than in the other three treatments.
With respect to punishment levels the results presented in
Andrighetto et al. (2013) directly suggest that there will be more
punishment in Treatment 1 than in Treatment 2, since the two
treatments differ only in the presence of communication
opportunities at the contribution stage. Predictions for
Treatments 3 and 4 are less straightforward. As mentioned
above, given the rather complex design of our experiment, our
hypotheses are mostly about the bottom line of the interaction.
However, our strong a priori about the power of communication
leads us to predict that punishment will be less necessary and,
hence, used less whenever communication is possible.
Hypothesis 4: Punishment levels are higher in Treatment 1 than
in the other three treatments.
RESULTS
We begin by presenting the results pertaining to the levels of
contributions to the public good and then move to the results
about earnings levels and to the effects of punishment and
counter-punishment.
Contributions
Figure 1 displays the contribution levels in a total of six
treatments. For the moment focus on the four treatments
involving counter-punishment. During rounds 1–10
contribution levels decline in all treatments, with average
contributions being 8.44, 11.14, 8.22 and 9.19 in the punishment
and counter-punishment, the sanction and counter-punishment,
the punishment and counter-punishment with message,
and the sanction and counter-punishment with message
treatment respectively. Pairwise non-parametric tests show
that contribution levels in Treatment 2 is higher than both
in Treatments 1 and 3. Given that in rounds 1–10 all four
treatments were identical any differences can only be random.
For rounds 11–20, one can see in the figure that three of
the treatments have similar levels, while a fourth treatment
has a noticeably lower level. Average contribution levels are
10.03, 15.03, 15.42, and 14.05 in the punishment and counter-
punishment, sanction and counter-punishment, punishment
and counter-punishment with message required, and sanction
and counter-punishment with message required treatments
respectively. In this case pair-wise non-parametric tests Mann-
Whitney U-tests find that contributions in Treatment 1 are
significantly lower than in each of the other treatments, whereas
there are no differences between the other three treatments
(p-values: 1–2 p = 0.0116; 1–3 p = 0.0056; 1–4 p = 0.0423; 2–
3 p = 0.9020; 2–4 p = 0.7676; 3–4 p = 0.7119)17. In terms of the
hypotheses presented in Results, we find support for hypotheses
1a and 1b, but not for 1c.
In the last 10 rounds, when punishment, normative message,
counter-punishment and the opportunity to justify their own
actions are switched off, contributions decay in all four cases
to average levels of 5.68, 8.12, 9.24, and 8.53. Observe that
contribution levels of the punishment and counter-punishment
treatment are always the lowest. However, now only the
difference between Treatments 1 and 3 remains significant.
Comparing average contribution levels between ten-round
blocks within treatments we find that for Treatment 1 there
is no significant difference between blocks 1 and 2 and while
for all other treatments there is a significant increase from
block 1 to block 2. We find that the three treatments involving
communication at any of the two relevant stages lead to
significantly higher contributions than the baseline treatment.
The detrimental effect of allowing for counter-punishment is
neutralized in the presence of communication possibilities.
We find no difference between the three treatments with
communication. Separately the communication of norms and
being held accountable work equally well and we find no
interaction effect from using them jointly.
Table 2 shows the results of hurdle model regressions. In
both models the endogenous variable is the contribution level
in block 2 (rounds 11–20). In Model 1 we only have categorical
independent variables, where the case in which neither message
17In all non-parametric tests reported in the paper the unit of observation is the
group. Here group-level contributions are averaged across rounds within a block.
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FIGURE 1 | Average contribution levels, comparing treatments with (Pun+Count; Sanc+Count; Pun+CountMes; Sanc+CountMes), and without a
second punishment stage (Punishment and Sanction).
is possible is the omitted category. First, one can see that the
round variable is not significant for the contribution decision but
is positive and significant at the 10% level for the contribution
level. Second, the three variables corresponding to the treatments
with messages all have positive and significant coefficients for the
contribution level, but not for the contribution decision.
Model 2 includes lagged punishment and lagged counter-
punishment as well as interaction effects with all three
treatments18. With respect to the pure treatment effects the
results ofModel 2 are similar to those ofModel 1, while the round
variable is now significantly negative for the decision and not
significant for the level.
Moving to the effects of the lagged variables and their
interactions we can see that for lagged punishment there are
no significant effects on contribution levels, but there are on
the contribution decision. For the contribution decision the
pattern of the interaction effects is interesting. Observe first
that lagged punishment has a significantly positive coefficient
showing that in the baseline treatment without communication
opportunities punishment has the expected effect. Note that
the interaction effect between the Pun+CountMes variable and
lagged punishment received is also significantly positive. This
is the treatment without message at the contribution stage, so
that the effect of lagged punishment seems intuitive in this
case, in contrast to the negative interaction effects for the
other two treatments. Testing for the sum of the coefficients,
lagpunreceived+treat3∗lagpunreceived, we find that it is positive
18For ease of notation in the table we have changed the names of the treatments
and now use numbers. See Table 1.
and significant at the 1% level. In contrast, observe that the
interaction effects for the other two treatments are significant but
negative. In this case the corresponding sums of coefficients are
not significantly different from zero. Hence, lagged punishment
has an effect on contributions in the two treatments with
no possibility for communicating norms at the contribution
stage. This is consistent with the notion that in the absence of
communication punishment is the instrument that is used to
make contributions go up, whereas in the other treatments this
is accomplished by communication itself.
The pattern of counter-punishment effects is harder to
explain. We find that in the baseline treatment it has a significant
positive effect on the contribution level but not on the decision.
Moving directly to the sums of coefficients which capture the
total effects of the other treatments, the results show that the
coefficients for lagcpunreceived+treat2∗lagcpunreceived and
lagcpunreceived+treat3∗lagcpunreceived are both significantly
positive for the contribution decision but not for the level,
whereas lagcpunreceived+treat4∗lagcpunreceived has a
significantly negative effect on the level but not on the decision.
Our main contribution in this paper is the study of
environments involving counter-punishment possibilities.
However, it is also interesting to relate our results here to those
of two other treatments previously reported in Andrighetto et al.
(2013). The experiments reported in that paper were conducted
with the same subject pool and in the same lab as the ones
corresponding to the treatments of Table 1. In addition, the
instructions were the same except for a few differences. The
two treatments from Andrighetto et al. (2013) that we refer to
are called punishment and sanction. Both these treatments only
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TABLE 2 | Contributions in block 2.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Contribution decision Contribution level Contribution decision Contribution level
Sanct+Count 0.320 (0.315) 5.288 (1.791)** 0.549 (0.413) 5.906 (1.854)**
Pun+CountMes −0.054 (0.326) 6.013 (1.587)*** 0.020 (0.430) 6.783 (1.659)***
Sanct+CountMes −0.263 (0.431) 4.863 (1.898)* −0.154 (0.432) 5.707 (2.023)**
Lagpunreceived 0.651 (0.185)*** −0.317 (0.178)
Treat2*lagpunreceived −0.919 (0.246)*** 0.072 (0.306)
Treat3*lagpunreceived 2.732 (0.354)*** 0.111 (0.350)
Treat4*lagpunreceived −0.710 (0.196)*** 0.086 (0.272)
Lagcpreceived −0.106 (0.064) 0.800 (0.127)***
Treat2*lagcpunreceived 3.095 (0.243)*** −1.219 (0.389)**
Treat3*lagcpunreceived 3.492 (0.285)*** −0.946 (0.286)***
Treat4*lagcpunreceived −0.055 (0.137) −1.765 (0.496)***
Round −0.054 (0.028) 0.169 (0.076)* −0.128 (0.033)*** −0.002 (0.079)
Constant 2.145 (0.221)*** 9.136 (1.297)*** 2.590 (0.291)*** 9.715 (1.300)***
Wald χ2 9.74* 655.60***
N 1840 1656
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Hurdle model consisting of probit and truncated regressions. Estimated with cluster robust S.E.s according to group.
have the contribution stage and the punishment stage, that is,
they lack the counter-punishment stage. The treatment called
punishment has a punishment stage just like Treatment 1 above
and the treatment called sanction has a punishment stage just
like Treatments 2 and 4 above, that is, participants can both
impose costly punishment with material consequences both for
the punisher and the punished subject and request a particular
contribution level together with sending a normative message
that is cost free.
For comparison Figure 1 also displays the contribution levels
in the two treatments previously reported in Andrighetto et al.
(2013) (punishment and sanction). For rounds 11–20, average
contribution levels are 10.03, 15.03, 15.42, 14.05, 10.65, and 14.46
in the punishment and counter-punishment, sanction and counter-
punishment, punishment and counter-punishment with message
required, sanction and counter-punishment withmessage required,
punishment, and sanction treatment respectively. Note also that
in the punishment treatment the increase in average cooperation
between blocks 1 and 2 is not large, a feature that can be attributed
to the presence of fixed identifiers across rounds.
There is no significant difference between the two treatments
with no communication (MW: 1-Pun: p = 0.8625). In
contrast contributions in the sanction and counter-punishment,
punishment and counter-punishment with message required,
sanction and counter-punishment with message required, and
sanction treatments are significantly higher by 50, 53.8, 40.1,
44.3% respectively, than in the punishment and counter-
punishment treatment in which no communication is allowed
(MW: 2-Pun: 0.0178; 3-Pun: 0.0056; 4-Pun: 0.0648, 1-Sanc:
0.0326).
At the same time, there are not significant differences
between the sanction treatment, in which norm communication
is allowed but only one stage punishment is present, and
the other 3 treatments, in which both communication (i.e.,
message about the prescribed conduct and/or message justifying
counter punishment) and a second punishment stage are allowed.
Contribution levels are not always lower in the presence of
counter-punishment opportunities (MW: 2- Sanc: p= 0.8294; 3-
Sanc: p= 0.6033; 4- Sanc: p= 0.9509).
We can now summarize our findings about contribution levels
in the following two results:
Result 1: When communication of any form is possible (i.e.,
communication of norms or communication aimed to explain
one’s action), contributions levels are significantly higher than
when it is not possible.
Result 2: The presence of counter-punishment opportunities
does not necessarily imply a decrease in contribution levels.
Earnings
We move directly to looking at the earnings levels, since they
constitute the bottom line of what we are interested in. If
communication in the presence of counter-punishment only led
to higher contribution levels, but not to higher earnings levels,
one could say that effectively it is not very useful19. After this we
will look at how punishment, counter-punishment and the two
types of communication are used.
Table 3 shows average earnings levels per block and per
treatments, including both the four treatments involving
counter-punishment and the two treatments without it,
previously reported in Andrighetto et al. (2013), where the latter
are shown in italics. Starting with the comparisons between the
four treatments involving counter-punishment we find that in
19As already mentioned in the introduction, in some environments the presence
of punishment opportunities of different kinds has led to higher contributions, but
lower earnings.
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TABLE 3 | Average earnings.
Treatment Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
1. Punishment and counter-punishment 25.07 22.64 23.41
2. Sanction and counter-punishment 26.69 26.55 24.87
3. Punishment and counter-punishment
with message
24.93 25.66 25.55
4. Sanction and counter-punishment with
message
25.51 25.71 25.12
Punishment 23.75 21.43 22.25
Sanction 24.94 28.03 25.45
block 1 earnings levels of Treatment 2 are significantly higher
than in Treatments 1 and 3. This difference is purely random,
since in block 1 the instructions are identical for all treatments.
We nowmove to block 2, which is our primary focus. Figure 1
reveals that in the initial rounds of block 2 contributions in the
three treatments with communication are growing while in the
punishment and counter-punishment treatment the average level
of the block is reached more quickly. As will be shown below,
punishment is also stronger in early rounds. We therefore test for
treatment differences in earnings using the data from rounds 16
to 20. We find that there are no differences in earnings between
the three treatments involving communication (i.e., sanction
and counter-punishment, punishment and counter-punishment
with message, sanction and counter-punishment with message). In
contrast, in the punishment and counter-punishment treatment
the average earnings are significantly lower than in the other
3 treatments, with p = 0.016, p = 0.004 and p = 0.074 for
the comparisons with Treatments 2, 3 and 4 respectively20. In
relation to the hypotheses presented in section, our evidence is
consistent with hypotheses 2a and 2b, but not with 2c.
Comparing earnings levels of the four new treatments with
those of the two treatments without counter-punishment, we
find that earnings in the punishment treatment are significantly
lower than in all treatments with communication and not
significantly different than in the punishment and counter-
punishment treatment. In contrast, earnings in the sanction
treatment are significantly higher than in the treatments without
communication opportunities at the punishment stage and the
same as in the treatments with communication opportunities
(MW: 1-Pun: p = 0.4529; 2-Pun: p = 0.0081; 3-Pun: p = 0.0179;
4-Pun: 0.0489; 1-Sanc: 0.0047; 2- Sanc: 0.2679; 3- Sanc: 0.0647; 4-
Sanc: 0.2423)21.
Our main results with respect to earnings can be summarized
as follows:
Result 3: The presence of counter-punishment opportunities
only leads to a decrease in earnings when communication of
any type is not possible.
20In block 3 earnings are still significantly higher in Treatments 3 and 4 than in
Treatment 1, but earnings in Treatment 2 are not higher.
21Observe that the result that the mere addition of counter-punishment
opportunities has not effect on earnings levels (MW 1-Pun= 0.4529) is not in line
with the result in Nikiforakis (2008). The likely explanation is that we use fixed
identifiers across rounds.
Result 4: The possibility of communicating leads to
significantly higher earnings, regardless of whether
counter-punishment is possible.
Punishment Behavior and Messages Sent
in the Second Stage
The left panel of Figure 2 shows the average number of
punishment points sent per decision for the four treatments with
a counter-punishment stage. Overall, the number of points sent
seems rather low, since themaximum for each decision is 10, with
the level in round 11 being, in some treatments, somewhat higher
than in the other treatments.
Table 4 shows the results of hurdle model regressions
pertaining to punishment. The results for Model 1 show that
there are no treatment effects for both the punishment decision
and the punishment level, as suggested by the figure. In addition
the variable “round” has a negative effect on the decision but not
on the level, something which is not directly visible in the figure.
In Model 2 we have added two regressors that need
an explanation: “Own_Pos_Diff” and “Group_Pos_Diff.” Let i
indicate the person who is the potential punisher and j a potential
target. Then we define the variable of Own_Pos_Diff of person
i in period t as Own_Pos_Dif fi,t ≡ max{0, ci,t − cj,t} and
Group_Pos_Dif fi,t ≡ max{0, (
∑
h6=j
ch,t)/(n − 1) − cj,t} where ci,t
is the contribution of individual i in period t and h runs from
1 to 4 and refers to the group members. Thus, the variables
represent the difference in contribution between the punisher
and the potential target and the difference between the average
contribution of the group (excluding the potential target) and
the potential target’s contribution, and we expect that both
higher Own_Pos_Diff and Group_Pos_Diff are linked with more
punishment. We find that both variables have a significantly
positive effect on the punishment decision but not the level
and Group_Pos_Diff has a significant positive effect on the
punishment level. In addition, observe that in Model 2 there are
no treatment differences in punishment decision and level.
We summarize:
Result 5: There are no differences in the decision to punish and
in the punishment level between the four treatments.
Who Punishes Whom in the First and Second
Punishment Stages
At this point we know that there are no significant differences
in punishment levels between the different treatments, but it
remains to be seen what the patterns of punishment are and
whether there are any treatment differences. The left panel of
Figure 3 shows how the number of punishment points assigned
depends on the difference between the contributions of the
punisher and of the punished. Observe first that anti-social
punishment, i.e., punishment of participants who contributed
relatively much, is rather infrequent. Second, observe that, for
positive deviations, punishment is higher the more the target
is behind. Finally, observe also that the overall patterns of
punishment are not much different between the treatments.
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FIGURE 2 | Average number of punishment points and of counter-punishment points sent per decision in the four treatments with a second
punishment stage, in rounds 11–20.
TABLE 4 | Punishment in block 2.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Punishment decision Punishment level Punishment decision Punishment level
Sanct+Count 0.092 (0.151) 0.666 (1.536) 0.068 (0.146) 0.162 (0.695)
Pun+CountMes 0.054 (0.151) 0.344 (1.850) 0.065 (0.159) 0.475 (0.943)
Sanct+CountMes 0.078 (0.191) 1.945 (3.065) 0.107 (0.206) 1.365 (1.115)
Own_Pos_Diff 0.057 (0.017)*** −0.021 (0.113)
Group_Pos_Diff 0.063 (0.019)*** 0.399 (0.166)*
Round −0.125 (0.022)*** −0.378 (0.360) −0.119 (0.022)*** −0.227 (0.166)
Constant −1.114 (0.131)*** −5.898 (8.922) −1.469 (0.122)*** −4.059 (3.643)
Wald χ2 35.41*** 199.55***
N 5520 5520
*p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
Hurdle model consisting of probit and truncated regressions. Estimated with cluster robust S.E.s according to group.
Messages Sent in the Sanction and
Counter-Punishment Treatment
Recall that in the first punishment stage of the sanction and
counter-punishment and in the sanction and counter-punishment
with message treatment, subjects can send to the other group
members both material punishment points and a message with
the following content, choosing between options (1), (2), and
(3): “One should contribute X (indicating the demanded token
amount), because (1) in this way we are all better off; (2) it is what
one should do, and (3) if not it will have consequences for you.”
Table 5 displays the average required contribution level for the
two relevant treatments. The average contribution levels required
are 15.38 and 16.04, with no significant difference between the
treatments. Interestingly, these are very close to the average
contribution levels observed in these two treatments.
The frequencies of the three messages sent in stage 2 are
very similar for the two treatments in which such messages are
possible. Message 1 receives 71% and 72% in the two treatments
respectively, whereas message 2 is sent between 10 and 20%
of the times and message 3 is sent in 10% or less of the
cases22.
22The results for the messages are very similar to the ones reported in Andrighetto
et al. (2013) for the sanction treatment.
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FIGURE 3 | Average number of punishment and counter-punishment points sent as a function of the differences between the contributions of the
punisher and the potential target in the four treatments with a second punishment stage, in rounds 11–20. The numbers above the bars indicate the total
number of decisions pertaining to each case.
TABLE 5 | Average required contribution levels over rounds 11–20 in the sanction and counter-punishment and in the sanction and counter-punishment
with message required treatments.
Round 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Sanct+Count 13.49 16.27 14.89 16.52 16.45 16.20 15.89 13.01 15.21 15.61
Sanct+CountMes 13.74 15.50 16.23 16.87 16.73 16.85 16.29 15.69 16.37 19.47
TABLE 6 | Counter-punishment in block 2.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Counter-punishment decision Counter-punishment level Counter-punishment decision Counter-punishment level
Sanct+Count −0.140 (0.208) −17.798 (12.672) −0.172 (0.200) −10.993 (5.210)*
Pun+CountMes 0.303 (0.210) −23.398 (14.865) 0.295 (0.204) −14.623 (5.300)**
Sanct+CountMes 0.074 (0.242) −33.155 (26.573) 0.093 (0.245) −18.148 (8.594)*
Own_Pos_Diff 0.061 (0.020)** 0.057 (0.425)
Group_Pos_Diff 0.023 (0.015) 0.854 (0.431)*
Round −0.082 (0.019)*** 1.051 (1.253) −0.074 (0.018)*** 0.671 (0.542)
Constant −1.220 (0.193)*** −23.647 (28.506) −1.453 (0.196)*** −13.957 (10.228)
Wald χ2 28.26*** 73.38***
N 5520 5520
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Hurdle model consisting of probit and truncated regressions. Estimated with cluster robust S.E.s according to group.
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Result 6: There are no significant differences in the use of
messages in stage 2 between the two treatments in which such
messages are possible: the sanction and counter-punishment
treatment and the sanction and counter-punishment with
message treatment.
Counter-Punishment Behavior and
Messages Sent in the Third Stage
The right panel of Figure 2 shows the average number of
counter-punishment points sent per decision in the four relevant
treatments. The data are in line with the ones for punishment
shown in the left panel of Figure 2. Overall, counter-punishment
is rather low.
Table 6 shows the results of hurdle models pertaining to
counter-punishment. In Model 1 none of the treatment variables
are significant (but observe that all the ones pertaining to the
counter-punishment level have a negative sign). In Model 2,
where we have added the deviation variables, all the treatment
variables have a significant negative sign, indicating that counter-
punishment in the Pun+Count treatment is higher than in the
other three. Note also that in Model 2 some of the deviation
variables are significantly positive.
In Table 7 we show results of hurdle models where to
the independent variables of Table 6 we have added the two
key variables “punishment received” and “lagged punishment
received.” The former refers to the amount of punishment
received from another member of the group at the punishment
stage in the same period; the latter refers to the amount of
punishment received from another member of the group at the
punishment stage in the previous period. These variables are ego
and target specific. Both variables are significantly and positively
related with counter-punishment decision, but not with the level.
Observe also that both inModels 1 and 2 the counter-punishment
level in two of the treatments involving communication is lower
than in the baseline.
Result 7: There is some indication that counter-punishment
levels are higher in Pun+Count than in the other three
treatments.
Who Punishes Whom in the Counter-Punishment
Stage
The right hand panel of Figure 3 shows counter-punishment
as a function of the contribution of the punisher and of the
punished (the target). One can see that there is a tendency to
counter-punish more the higher the deviation of contributions,
similarly to what is shown in the left hand panel for first
stage punishment. Observe also that in this case there is also
some indication that counter-punishment is higher for positive
contribution deviations of the punished.
Counter-Punishment and Messages
The frequency of use of messages at the counter-punishment
stage is completely parallel to the use of counter-punishment,
since a message has to be sent if and only if counter-
punishment is used. Therefore, its use does not reveal any
additional information about the use of counter-punishment
FIGURE 4 | Message content over rounds 11–20 in the punishment and
counter-punishment with message required and in the sanction and
counter-punishment with message required treatment.
to that already shown. Figure 4 shows the percentages of
message sent, organized by content, in the sanction and counter-
punishment and in the sanction and counter-punishment with
message-required treatment, where every message has been
classified into one of the categories23. There are no striking
differences. However, one can see that the blank message is
sent more frequently in Treatment 4. We conjecture that in
this case an explicit message is perceived as less useful, since
communication was already possible at stage 2, the punishment
stage. Relatedly, observe also that the message asking for
the maximum contribution of 20 tokens is more frequent in
Treatment 3 than in Treatment 4, since communication in
Treatment 4 involves precisely the specification of a required
contribution level, which does not need to be repeated at this
point. Note finally how friendly messages are quite frequent,
something that has been observed in other experiments: when
free-formmessages can be used participants are typically friendly,
perhaps to create an atmosphere conducive to cooperation24.
Punishment across Stages
A final issue of interest is whether punishment is linked
across stages. The fact that in our setting the punishment
technology is the same in both stages and everybody is allowed
to punish at both stages may suggest substitution between
punishments across stages. Another question that arises is
whether such links between punishments across stages depend
on the treatment.
Table 8 shows the results of hurdle models for counter-
punishment where with respect to Table 6 we have added
the variable Pun_Stage_2, which corresponds to the number
23The messages were coded independently from the authors. The labeling of the
different message categories is self-explanatory, except perhaps for Max/20 which
refers to asking for the maximum possible contribution of 20.
24A reviewer asks about the relation between the threateningmessage at the second
stage and the high proportion of “friendly” messages in the counter-punishment
stage. Note that the threatening message is the least frequently used of all three and
is sent in <10% of cases. One possible connection between the messages is that
participants may have a tendency to want to establish a friendly rapport between
them. To do this it seems reasonable to avoid the threateningmessage at the second
stage and to be friendly at the third stage.
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TABLE 7 | Counter-punishment taking into account punishment received.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Counter-punishment decision Counter-punishment level Counter-punishment decision Counter-punishment level
Sanct+Count −0.255 (0.209) −16.520 (7.802)* −0.277 (0.208) −12.783 (5.844)*
Pun+CountMes 0.117 (0.214) −17.624 (7.984)* 0.111 (0.204) −14.171 (6.711)*
Sanct+CountMes −0.010 (0.233) −23.258 (12.970) 0.011 (0.241) −17.518 (9.331)
Punishment received 0.440 (0.126)*** −3.349 (3.070) 0.485 (0.137)*** −1.158 (2.034)
Lagged punishment received 0.142 (0.031)*** −2.010 (1.689) 0.162 (0.027)*** −1.030 (1.039)
Own_Pos_Diff 0.063 (0.022)** −0.361 (0.377)
Group_Pos_Diff 0.032 (0.017) 1.085 (0.492)*
Round −0.027 (0.016) 1.091 (0.950) −0.019 (0.017) 1.050 (0.624)
Constant −1.521 (0.199)*** −13.341 (12.370) −1.797 (0.214)*** −12.686 (9.050)
Wald χ2 58.50*** 82.05***
N 4968 4968
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Hurdle model consisting of probit and truncated regressions. Estimated with cluster robust S.E.s according to group.
of punishment points each person allocated to each other
group member in stage 2 of a given round. Since both the
dependent variable and Pun_Stage_2 variable are target specific,
Pun_Stage_2 indicates that people in a group punish and then
counter-punish the same other group members in a given round.
We have also added interaction terms between Pun_Stage_2 and
each of the treatment variables; inTable 8we use the abbreviation
PS2 in the names of the interaction terms.
Observe first that the impact of the three treatment variables is
qualitatively the same as in the regressions shown in Table 6. In
both Models 1 and 2 all treatment variables have a negative sign
with some of them being significant. The results of Table 8 are in
this sense consistent with our Result 7 where we write that there
is some indication that counter-punishment levels are higher in
Pun+Count than in the other three treatments.
With respect to the effect of Pun_Stage_2 we can see that
in both models and for both the counter-punishment decision
and the level the impact of this variable is significantly positive
meaning that in our baseline treatment punishment and counter-
punishment are complements and not substitutes. To examine
the relationship between punishing and counter-punishing in
the other treatments we examine the combination of main and
interaction coefficients. Table 9 shows the results of statistical
tests for the sums of the coefficients involving Pun_Stage_2.
These show that for essentially all treatments, in both models
and for both decision and level, punishing is likewise positively
related to counter-punishing. The sole exception occurs in the
decision to counter-punish in the Sanct+CountMes treatment in
Model 2. These results potentially indicate that some participants
have a general tendency to punish more than others.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We find that the presence of counter-punishment is only
detrimental to contribution and efficiency when communication
is not possible. The results of our study add to those of a number
of other experimental results that show that the presence of
communication very strongly affects behavior. A few examples
of experimental work that highlight how communication matters
in a variety of contexts are Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
Brandts and Cooper (2007), Ellman and Pezanis-Christou (2010),
and Brandts et al. (in press).
Our results show that communication enhances the ability
of individuals to self-govern and prevents the occurrence
of undesirable effects. Our interpretation is as follows. The
communication of norms both allows individuals to learn the
prescribed conduct and to coordinate on it and punishment to
be perceived as a way of enforcing norms and not a personally
motivated action. It increases cooperation, punishment serves
to maintain it, and the perceived legitimacy of punishment
will reduce counter-punishment reactions. At the same time
having to give account of the use of counter-punishment leads
individuals to consider others’ expectations about the prescribed
conduct. Since counter-punishing those that legitimately punish
constitutes a violation of a social norm, justification pressure
allows eliciting this norm about punishment and makes
individuals consider the consequences of its violation, thus
limiting counter-punishment acts. Both types of communication
help to render explicit the norms governing the experimental
setting, norms regulating contribution and punishment, and
prompt their compliance25.
However, our results also show that the uses of
communication at the two different points in the experiment
can’t be as neatly separated from each other as laid out in the
interpretation in the previous paragraph. Communication at
the final stage is often used to reinforce the communication
25A reviewer of the paper considers that our design does not allow us to claim
that communication enhances the ability of individuals to self-govern themselves,
because the messages we use are too constrained. We understand that the use of
pre-formulated messages may be a limited way to communicate norms, but we do
think that using them is an acceptable way of studying the effects of norms. Future
research could try to go into detail in analyzing the impact of different ways of
communicating norms
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TABLE 8 | Counter-punishment taking into account the interaction between punishment and treatment variables.
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Counter-punishment decision Counter-punishment level Counter-punishment decision Counter-punishment level
Pun_Stage_2 0.397 (0.098)*** 1.977 (0.745)** 0.240 (0.091)** 1.446 (0.652)*
Sanct+Count −0.160 (0.208) −9.191 (5.148) −0.176 (0.203) −8.150 (4.533)
Pun+CountMes 0.178 (0.205) −9.854 (5.148) 0.161 (0.197) −9.467 (4.670)*
Sanct+CountMes 0.065 (0.223) −15.311 (7.641)* 0.084 (0.227) −13.677 (6.502)*
(Sanct+Count)*PS2 −0.050 (0.149) 1.406 (1.148) −0.004 (0.137) 0.758 (0.872)
(Pun+CountMes)*PS2 0.632 (0.191)*** 0.252 (0.875) 0.714 (0.184)*** 0.348 (0.880)
(Sanct+CountMes)*PS2 −0.100 (0.176) 2.784 (1.695) −0.037 (0.181) 2.791 (1.601)
Own_Pos_Diff 0.063 (0.021)** −0.054 (0.217)
Group_Pos_Diff 0.002 (0.015) 0.473 (0.298)
Round −0.053 (0.015)*** 0.810 (0.494) −0.051 (0.015)*** 0.752 (0.394)
Constant −1.397 (0.185)*** −8.081 (6.044) −1.545 (0.195)*** −7.993 (5.205)
Wald χ2 114.35*** 137.88***
N 5520 5520
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Hurdle model consisting of probit and truncated regressions. Estimated with cluster robust S.E.s according to group.
TABLE 9 | Linear combination of coefficients from Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 8.
Coefficients Model 1 Model 2
Counter-punishment Counter-punishment Counter-punishment Counter-punishment
decision level decision level
Pun_Stage_2+ (Sanct+Count)*PS2 0.347** 3.383* 0.236* 2.204**
Pun_Stage_2+ (Pun+CountMes)*PS2 1.029*** 2.229** 0.954*** 1.794**
Pun_Stage_2+ (Sanct+CountMes)*PS2 0.298* 4.762* 0.203 4.237**
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
of norms about contributions and not only in relation to the
use of counter-punishment. This is mainly due to the repeated
nature of the interaction. Participants understand that what
they say in the last stage of a round may influence others’
behavior at the beginning of the next round. Indeed, of the
messages that are sent at the last stage of the round many are
not directly related to the use of counter-punishment, but refer
to what the expected contribution level at the first stage of the
game.
We find no difference in average behavior between the
treatments involving communication: the communication of
norms and accountability for the use of counter-punishment
have the same overall effect and even the joint use of both
communication possibilities does not improve on the separate
use. We find no differences in punishment behavior and
only some minor differences in counter-punishment behavior
between all four treatments, attributable to the use of fixed
identifiers across rounds. Moreover, if we consider the four
treatments with counter-punishment and the two without it,
first reported in Andrighetto et al. (2013), we can say that the
factor that organizes contribution and efficiency levels is the
not the presence of counter-punishment but the presence of
communication that allows norms to be elicited and made salient
and individuals to reason on them and consider the consequences
of their violations.
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